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Phenomenal consciousness has an important role in ethics: it is plausible that it is at least a 
necessary condition for a distinctive kind of moral status. There is a mismatch between this 
ethical role and an a posteriori (or “type-B”) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. I 
argue that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept of phenomenal 
consciousness is indeterminate between properties that are coextensive in the case of (fully 
conscious) humans but have radically different extensions in non-human animals. The result 
is that the moral status of many non-mammalian animals is indeterminate. Some ways of 





Phenomenal consciousness matters in ethics. It is, in particular, relevant to assessments of 
moral status. To give two examples: (i) our moral obligations towards a patient in a 
permanent vegetative state plausibly differ from our obligations towards a patient who is 
minimally conscious, because there is, at least some of the time, something it’s like to be the 
latter but not the former (Kahane & Savulescu 2009); (ii) if we could show that crabs and 
lobsters have a capacity for phenomenal consciousness—that there is something it’s like to be 
a crab—this could form the basis of an argument that they have morally significant interests 
in avoiding suffering (Birch 2017). The nature of the relationship between phenomenal 
consciousness and moral status merits further discussion (see Section 1), but it is widely 
agreed that there is such a relationship. 
  
Given this, there are possible solutions to the mind-body problem that would create serious 
trouble for ethics. This is most obviously true of eliminative materialism about 
consciousness, also known (in recent literature) as strong illusionism.1 This view holds that 
phenomenal consciousness does not exist. If strong illusionism is correct, and if phenomenal 
consciousness plays an important role in ethics, ethics may need significant revision. 
Kammerer (2020) has called this the “normative challenge” for strong illusionism. But 
perhaps ethicists should not be unduly worried about this, since the challenge can be avoided 
by denying strong illusionism. 
  
My focus here will be on a significantly more popular approach to the mind-body problem: a 
posteriori materialism, or “type-B” materialism in Chalmers’ (2010) terminology. The type-B 
materialist holds that, although there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal 
truths that is exploited by anti-materialist arguments, this epistemic gap can be explained 
without positing any ontological gap between physical and phenomenal facts. In a 
particularly influential version of the view, the epistemic gap is to be explained by appeal to 
phenomenal concepts. These are concepts we use for thinking about our experiences, and 
they are posited to be radically different from the concepts we use to think about the physical 
world, with the result that there are no a priori connections between phenomenal concepts 
and non-phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990; Carruthers 2000; Papineau 2002). This has come 
to be known as the “phenomenal concept strategy” (Stoljar 2005; Balog 2012). 
 
Since the type-B materialist does not deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness, it is 
not so obvious that that the view holds revisionary consequences for ethics. But I will argue 
that it does. I will argue that, if type-B materialism is true, then, given a plausible account of 
the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral status, facts of great ethical 
significance turn out to be indeterminate.  
 
The next section argues for the claim that a capacity for phenomenal consciousness is 
necessary condition for a step change in moral status. The subsequent section argues for the 
claim that, if type-B materialism is true, then the reference of the concept PHENOMENAL 
 
1 I am using the term “strong illusionism” here in the sense of Chalmers (2018). Frankish (2016) uses the term 
in a slightly different sense. 
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CONSCIOUSNESS is indeterminate between physical properties that are coextensive in the 
case of (fully conscious) humans but have very different extensions in non-human animals. 
These premises combine to yield the disturbing conclusion that, in many cases, it is 
indeterminate whether or not an animal has the kind of moral status that is associated with 
phenomenal consciousness. I then consider various ways to manage this indeterminacy—and 
find all the options troubling. 
  
1. Phenomenal consciousness, valence and moral status: in search of common ground 
A being with moral status has at least some interests that matter morally in their own right, 
and not just because they matter to some other being. I want to leave open the possibility that 
non-conscious beings can have moral status. Some maintain, for example, that ecosystems, or 
foetuses not yet capable of forming conscious states, or unconscious patients who will never 
regain consciousness, have moral status. On some ethical theories, such as hedonic 
utilitarianism (Singer 1995) and Regan’s (2004) animal rights theory, the capacity to have 
conscious experiences is a necessary condition for moral status. However, I want to avoid 
assuming any particular ethical theory.  
 
In order to remain neutral on these claims, I will say merely that a step change in moral status 
is associated with a capacity for conscious experience. My hope is that this can be a point of 
broad ethical consensus. The term “step change” is intended to be neutral between a step 
from zero moral status to moral status, and a step from a pre-existing, basic form of moral 
status to a new form. I will use the rather awkward term “phenomenality-linked moral 
status” (PLMS) to label the stepped-up form of moral status associated with phenomenal 
consciousness.2 
 
What can we say about the nature of the step change without losing the desired neutrality? I 
think it can be a point of wide agreement that a conscious being’s interests ought to factor 
into moral deliberation in a distinctive way, such that these interests receive greater weight 
than they would have received if they were the interests of a non-conscious being, if we allow 
that the non-conscious have interests at all. When we find evidence that a patient thought to 
be permanently unconscious is in fact having conscious experiences at least some of the time, 
their interests (e.g. in adequate nutrition and hydration) appropriately receive greater moral 
weight. Likewise, when we find evidence that an animal thought to be wholly unconscious 
has conscious experiences, their interests (e.g. in humane treatment and good welfare) 
appropriately receive greater moral weight. 
 
Is it phenomenal consciousness as such that explains this step change, or a special type of 
phenomenally conscious state? Various authors (e.g. DeGrazia 1996; Singer 2011; Korsgaard 
2018; Shepherd 2018) have proposed that it is not conscious experience as such but valenced 
conscious experience that explains the step change. Valenced conscious experiences are 
experiences that feel bad or feel good. Negatively valenced experiences include pain, 
 
2 See also Shevlin (2020a) on “psychological moral patiency”. The quest for neutrality among substantively 
different ethical theories seems to lead inevitably to awkward terminology. 
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pleasure, distress, anxiety, boredom, tiredness, hunger and thirst. These experiences typically 
motivate actions to alleviate them. Positively valenced experiences include pleasure, joy, 
warmth, comfort, satiety and excitement. These experiences typically motivate actions to 
sustain them. Any capacity for valenced conscious experience will ground interests to escape, 
or to sustain, certain types of experience, and these interests matter morally. 
 
One might wonder: could valence alone be enough to explain the step change, independently 
of phenomenal consciousness? This depends, first of all, on whether there can be valence 
without phenomenal consciousness. On one account of valence (that of Carruthers 2018), 
valence is the nonconceptual representation of value, and it is plausible that a state may 
represent value nonconceptually without being phenomenally conscious. Indeed, it seems 
necessary to posit non-conscious representations of value in order to explain the possibility of 
subliminal motivation (Pessiglione et al. 2007) and subliminal instrumental conditioning 
(Pessiglione et al. 2008, though cf. Skora et al. 2021). For example, Pessiglione et al. (2007) 
presented evidence that subjects find larger sums of money more strongly motivating than 
smaller sums, even if the amounts of money are presented subliminally. This suggests that 
the larger sums are assigned higher value than the smaller sums by unconscious motivational 
processes. 
 
Granting that there can be valenced states that are not phenomenally conscious, it makes 
sense to ask whether a capacity to form valenced mental states might already suffice for the 
step change in moral status we took to be associated with phenomenality. But I contend that a 
capacity for representing value would not suffice if the representations were always non-
conscious. A reinforcement learning algorithm represents value, but it is usually taken to do 
so non-consciously, and in a way that intuitively confers no moral status on it. Tomasik 
(2014) has argued that reinforcement learning algorithms do possess moral status (inspiring 
an organization called “People for the Ethical Treatment of Reinforcement Learners”) but 
Tomasik rests his case on the idea that algorithms may have a capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness, not on the idea that non-conscious representation of value is already 
sufficient. 
 
One might also wonder: could phenomenal consciousness alone be enough to explain the step 
change, independently of valence? At least in principle, there can be phenomenal 
consciousness without valence: experiences that feel neither bad nor good. It is not clear that 
humans can have such experiences: our overall conscious state arguably always contains an 
element of mood. But we can conceive easily enough of a being that has a subjective point of 
view on the world in which non-valenced states feature (it consciously experiences shapes, 
colours, sounds, odours, etc.) but in which everything is evaluatively neutral. Would such a 
being have the distinctive kind of moral status associated with conscious experience? If it 
would, it raises the possibility that valence, not phenomenal consciousness, is a redundant 
condition for PLMS.  
 
Chalmers (quoted in Wiblin et al. 2019) has offered the example of a Vulcan. The original 
Vulcans in Star Trek are not wholly without valenced experiences, but we can conceive of a 
 5 
“philosophical Vulcan” in which all valenced experience is dialled down to nothing, while 
leaving conscious perceptual experience, conscious thought, imagination, and episodic 
memory in place. Carruthers (2005) also considers such a being, which he names 
“Phenumb”. Intuitively, a philosophical Vulcan has some moral status: it would be wrong 
(for Chalmers, “monstrous”) to destroy such a being for no reason at all. In a similar vein, 
Kriegel (2019, p. 515) suggests that “we have duties towards not only human beings but all 
conscious beings, including non-human conscious animals: these animals ought to be treated 
as ends, quite independently of the hedonic quality of their lives”.  
 
In opposition, Lee (2019) offers the example of a being that experiences a maximally simple 
non-valenced experience, such as an experience of slight brightness. The example is 
reminiscent of Ginsburg and Jablonka’s (2007, p. 220) example of a being who experiences 
only “white noise”—Ginsburg and Jablonka speculate that the first conscious experiences in 
the earliest nerve nets were something like this. Is the presence of conscious experiences of 
slight brightness, or white noise, enough to make the difference between the presence or 
absence of PLMS? Plausibly, it is not. 
 
Can we reconcile the conflicting intuitions elicited by these cases? Recall that moral status is 
crucially tied up with the possession of interests. What the philosophical Vulcan shows us, I 
suggest, is that interests can be grounded independently of valence. An autonomous rational 
being capable of reflectively endorsing goals and projects has interests, whether or not it has 
experiences of frustration, joy (and so on) associated with the success or failure of those 
projects. The step change in moral status associated with phenomenal consciousness is the 
change that comes when events that promote or thwart a being’s interests are registered in 
experience. The significance of valence is that it provides the necessary grounding for 
interests in beings who lack rational agency.  
 
The overall picture, then, is one on which a capacity for phenomenal consciousness as such is 
a necessary condition for PLMS. Facts sufficient to ground interests, either in the form of 
valence or the autonomous, rational endorsement of goals, must also be in place, and the 
promotion or thwarting of those interests must register in experience. A consequence of this 
picture is that the moral status of non-human animals depends a great deal on which ones are 
capable of forming phenomenally conscious states. This is because, for many animals, 
valence is undoubtedly in place: we have good evidence of their ability to form 
representations of value and disvalue that guide flexible decision-making.  
 
To illustrate, consider Crook’s (2021) recent study of responses to injury (injection of acetic 
acid) in Bock’s pygmy octopus (Octopus bocki). Injured octopuses showed directed 
grooming at the site of the acetic acid injection that was abolished by a local anaesthetic, 
lidocaine. More than this, they came to prefer chambers in which they had been placed after 
receiving lidocaine, and disprefer chambers in which they had received an injury. This type 
of evidence is widely regarded in animal welfare science as evidence of pain, an exemplar of 
a valenced experience.  
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There is evidence of this general type (reviewed in Sneddon et al. 2014) for mammals, birds, 
reptiles, fish, cephalopod molluscs, and decapod crustaceans. But this evidence invites the 
objection that to show valenced experience, it is not enough to show mere representation of 
value and disvalue—you also have to show that these representations are consciously 
experienced (Dawkins 2021; Paul et al. 2020). 
 
A step change in moral status for many animals thus hinges on the question of whether or not 
their representations of value and disvalue are consciously experienced. This is a hard 
question to answer conclusively, presenting serious methodological challenges that are not 
the topic of this article, but we can at least hope that the science of consciousness will one 
day be able to overcome these challenges, and that in the meantime it will produce relevant, 
albeit inconclusive evidence (for discussion of the methodological challenges, see Birch 
2020). This hope, however, rests on there being a determinate fact of the matter to be found. 
 
2. Mild and radical indeterminacy 
On any type-B materialist view that identifies phenomenal consciousness with a non-
fundamental, higher-level natural kind, some degree of sorites-style vagueness seems likely 
to arise at the edges, since this is a common and perhaps ubiquitous feature of such kinds. To 
illustrate, suppose we think phenomenally conscious states are patterns of thalamocortical 
activity supported by pyramidal neurons in layer 5 of the neocortex (a hypothesis set out by 
Aru et al. 2019). Various neurobiological kinds are in play in this hypothesis: thalamus, 
neocortex, pyramidal neuron, layer 5. If we could see the evolution of these traits unfolding 
over time, we would expect to see borderline cases of all of these kinds. For example, when 
the laminated structure of the mammalian neocortex was in the process of evolving, it seems 
likely that there would have been borderline cases between laminated and non-laminated 
cortices. 
 
This vagueness clashes with the intuition that phenomenal consciousness must always be 
determinately on or off, with no borderline cases, an intuition Anthony (2006) has called the 
“intuition of sharpness” (see also Simon 2017). I take it that type-B materialists who regard 
conscious experience as an evolved, non-fundamental natural kind must reject the intuition of 
sharpness and assert that borderline cases of conscious experience are possible (see also Lee 
2017; Godfrey-Smith 2020). That is simply part of the price of the view: a sense in which it is 
counterintuitive, to be added to the counterintuitiveness (for some) of rejecting the possibility 
of zombies.  
 
Several authors have noted that sorites-style vagueness, combined with a close connection 
between phenomenal consciousness and moral status, threatens to lead to borderline cases of 
moral status (Dunaway 2016; Cutter 2017; Godfrey-Smith 2020). However, there is no 
particular reason to expect sorites-style vagueness to lead to a widespread meltdown of our 
ethical deliberations regarding animals. Firstly, there may not be any extant species 
occupying the borderline region for any of the relevant kinds (for example, all extant 
mammals determinately have a neocortex). Secondly, even if there are some extant 
borderline cases, they are likely to represent a very small fraction of species. This is implicit 
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in the idea that neurobiological and cognitive kinds are natural kinds that in some sense 
“carve nature at the joints”, with most cases lying between the joints. If we found a putative 
cognitive/neurobiological kind such that a vast majority of animals were borderline cases 
with respect to that kind, this would lead scientists to revise the kind. To be sure, sorites-style 
vagueness regarding moral status has interesting implications for meta-ethics, as Cutter 
(2017) has noted, since meta-ethical positions incompatible with vagueness about moral 
obligation will also be incompatible with plausible forms of materialism. Yet in so far as it 
need not threaten our practical deliberations about what to do outside of a small number of 
cases, sorites-style vagueness is a mild form of indeterminacy. 
 
Several prominent defenders of type-B materialism (Papineau 1993, 2002, 2003, 2020; 
Carruthers 2019; Balog 2020), have noted that it raises the spectre of a much more pervasive 
and troubling form of indeterminacy. The threat here is that the reference of the concept 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS is indeterminate between properties that are 
coextensive in the paradigm case of a human who can report their experiences, but that differ 
radically in their extensions outside of this paradigm case. 
  
Why would that be? For most concepts, the story of how the reference of the concept is fixed 
will normally give at least some role to conceptions: the stock of beliefs a subject associates 
with the concept. We need not be internalists about mental content to allow some role for 
conceptions in fixing reference. For example, my correct belief that platypuses are egg-laying 
mammals is likely to form part of the explanation for why my concept PLATYPUS 
successfully refers to platypuses.  
  
Yet for the type-B materialist, most if not all of the conceptions we associate with 
phenomenal consciousness are misconceptions. The type-B materialist parts ways here with 
the analytic functionalist (e.g. Lewis 1983), who takes us to conceive of conscious 
experiences as states that play a certain type of functional role. The type-B materialist agrees 
with the dualist that there are no a priori links between phenomenal consciousness and any 
functional concept. The concept of phenomenal consciousness is not even partly the concept 
of a functional role or its realizer. Instead, we tend to think that phenomenal consciousness is 
non-functional, irreducible, intrinsic, qualitative, primitive, ineffable, physically inexplicable, 
unknowable from the outside, that its essence is fully revealed to us first-personally, and so 
on. But the type-B materialist parts ways with the dualist by holding that these intuitive 
judgements are false. Rejecting these conceptions allows the rejection of dualism, but it 
means the type-B materialist must hold that PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS refers to a 
physical property in spite of the conceptions associated with the concept, not because of 
them.3  
 
I say “most, if not all” to allow that some fairly minimal conceptions may survive the type-B 
 
3 Alternatively, the type-B materialist may argue that no conceptions at all are associated with PHENOMENAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS, because it is a bare, indexical concept, its content being roughly “this sort of thing” (see 
Carruthers 2019). This is still a view on which conceptions play no role in fixing reference. 
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materialist bonfire. In particular, a type-B materialist will endorse the conception that 
phenomenal consciousness is a property that the referents of our phenomenal concepts have 
in common, and the conception that phenomenal consciousness has effects in the physical 
world (without being definable in terms of these effects). The problem is that the surviving 
conceptions are far too minimal to triangulate a single physical property. 
  
The result is that, when giving a positive account of how the concept’s reference is fixed, the 
type-B materialist must work with a very limited set of resources. When explaining the 
reference of a concept like ARTHRITIS, we can (as Burge 1979 argued) appeal to deference 
to experts to show how successful reference can be compatible with serious misconceptions. 
But it would be implausible to appeal to deference to experts to explain the reference of 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS, since it is generally supposed to be a concept that we 
can grasp intuitively by reflecting on our own conscious experiences. There are no textbook 
definitions for us to consult; the textbooks refer us back to our own experiences.   
  
With conceptions and deference off the table, there is not much the type-B materialist can say 
except that our applications of PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS successfully track a 
physical property, despite all our substantive misconceptions about the nature of that 
property. They track the property in the sense that all and only the states to which we are 
disposed to apply the concept first-personally in fact possess that property. The materialist 
can then argue that successful tracking is enough for successful reference, even in the 
presence of substantial misconceptions. But now indeterminacy looms, because our 
applications of PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS are likely to successfully track more 
than one physical property. These properties are coextensive in our own (first-person) case, 
and are generally coextensive in fully conscious humans (as opposed to humans in a 
minimally conscious state), but have very different extensions outside these cases. 
  
I will focus here on a version of the problem from Papineau (2002), which I take to be the 
most troubling version. For Papineau, PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS successfully 
tracks properties at least two different levels of organization: a high-level functional property 
and its neuronal realizer (Papineau 2002, p. 214). Our first-person applications of 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS to our own states (as when I judge, for example, that I 
am consciously experiencing a perception of a blue sky, but am not consciously experiencing 
the digestion of my breakfast) will track a high-level functional property. The science and 
philosophy of consciousness gives us several important candidates for this functional 
property. In broad terms, it may be entry to a global workspace (Dehaene and Changeux 
2011; Dehaene 2014) or something causally upstream of entry to a global workspace, such as 
entry to fragile short-term memory (Block 2007, 2011) or something causally downstream of 
entry to a global workspace, such as becoming the object of a higher-order thought 
(Rosenthal 2005; LeDoux 2019). Let us assume, perhaps optimistically, that the science of 
consciousness will eventually reach consensus about what this high-level functional property 
is, and let us call it property F.  
 
Crucially, this high-level functional property, whatever it is, will be coextensive in humans 
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with a particular neuronal mechanism (or set of mechanisms) that realizes it. For example, 
entry to the global workspace may be coextensive with activation of a neuronal mechanism 
involving pyramidal neurons in the prefrontal cortex and the “global ignition” of many 
cortical regions (Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Dehaene 2014; Mashour et al. 2020). Again, 
let us assume optimistically that the science of consciousness will converge on a single such 
neuronal mechanism, and call it property N. I want to assume as little as possible about the 
nature of N. In particular, I leave open the possibility that N will be shared by all mammals 
and will not be specific to primates or to humans. What seems very unlikely at this stage, 
however, is that N will be shared by a wide range of non-mammalian animals. This is 
because we already have clear evidence that conscious experience is intimately related to 
mechanisms in the neocortex, a brain region that has evolved since the divergence of the 
mammals from other lineages (Dehaene 2014; Koch et al. 2016; Frith 2019; Aru et al. 2020). 
If F has evolved in other, non-mammalian lineages, then it must have a non-cortical neuronal 
implementation that differs substantially from its cortical neuronal implementation in 
mammals. 
 
Papineau’s point is this: there will be no way to resolve the question of whether 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS refers to F or to N. Moreover, this is not, he suggests, 
merely the result of epistemic limitations. This is a point of contrast with Block (2002), who 
assumes that there must be some fact of the matter about whether F or N is phenomenal 
consciousness, but argues that we cannot know this fact. Papineau contends that the reference 
of the concept PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS is indeterminate between F and N. We 
are disposed to apply the concept, in our own case, to states that instantiate both properties. 
There is nothing in the concept, or in its associated conceptions, or in our use of it, that could 
fix just one of these properties as the unique referent. They are equally eligible candidates for 
reference. And yet the distribution of F and N in the natural world may well be very different: 
N is likely to be specific to mammals for the reasons noted above, whereas F may turn out to 
be possessed by a very wide range of animals (birds, reptiles, fish, cephalopods, arthropods) 
which have evolved a different neuronal implementation of the same functional property. 
This point is highlighted in the context of global workspace theory (the source of one 
important candidate for F) by Dehaene, who writes “I would not be surprised if we 
discovered that all mammals, and probably many species of birds and fish, show evidence of 
a convergent evolution to the same sort of conscious workspace” (Dehaene 2014, p. 246). F 
but not N may also be possessed by non-living entities, such as future AI systems and robots, 
as emphasized by Dehaene et al. (2017).4 
 
Carruthers, another prominent type-B materialist, arrives at a similar conclusion via a 
different route.5 Carruthers (2019, pp. 155-160) draws an analogy with a person who 
 
4 Papineau’s argument has received surprisingly little discussion. Taylor (2013) and Balog (2020) are 
exceptions. Taylor rebuts a distinct argument from Papineau (2002), the so-called “methodological meltdown” 
argument, but does not rebut the argument for referential indeterminacy between F and N. 
5 There are differences between Papineau and Carruthers that I lack the space to discuss here. For Carruthers, 
the main threat is not one of indeterminacy between F and N, but indeterminacy between functional properties 
specified at different grains of analysis. For example, the coarse-grained functional property of possessing a 
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sometimes remarks, of a neighbourhood, that it is “that sort of neighbourhood”. Suppose 
there is more than one property that these judgements track, and that these properties happen 
to be coextensive in the part of the world where the person lives. Perhaps they track both low 
socioeconomic deprivation and low levels of gun ownership. Now we ask: which 
neighbourhoods would be “that sort of neighbourhood” in a different country where these 
properties are no longer coextensive? To settle such a question in practice, we could present 
the person with those neighbourhoods (or pictures of them) and see what they judge. Whether 
or not we actually do this, the person will still have dispositions to judge counterfactual 
neighbourhoods as “that sort” or “not that sort”, and these dispositions may be enough to 
triangulate a single property as the referent of “that sort of neighbourhood”. 
 
For Carruthers, the concept PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS works like the phrase “that 
sort of neighbourhood”. We acquire the concept by picking out various particular experiences 
first-personally, and then forming a concept of “that sort of thing”. Our applications of the 
concept track different properties that are coextensive in our own case. We then ask: to which 
non-human mental states does this concept apply? As with “that sort of neighbourhood”, the 
way to settle such a question would be to present that subject with the non-human mental 
states in question, first-personally, and see what they judge. We can’t do that, but one might 
hope that—as in the neighbourhood case—we could use a subject’s dispositions-to-judge 
regarding non-human mental states to triangulate a single physical property as the referent. 
But these counterfactuals, Carruthers argues, are non-evaluable: there is simply no fact of the 
matter about whether I would, or would not, first-personally judge a particular non-human 
mental state to be phenomenally conscious, given the chance.6 Given this, Carruthers argues, 
we should accept that there is no fact of the matter about whether a non-human mental state is 
phenomenally conscious or not. We have run out of reference-fixing resources. 
 
One possible way to resist the threat of radical indeterminacy is suggested by Shea (2012). 
Shea notes that there is one more reference-fixing resource available to the type-B 
materialist: the role played by PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS in inductive inferences.7 
Return here to “that sort of neighbourhood”. If we find that the person uses this phrase in 
inductive inferences (e.g. “it’s that sort of neighbourhood, so litter on the street will soon be 
picked up.”) we can ask what property explains the success of these inferences. This 
property, argues Shea, is a more eligible candidate for reference than a coextensive property 
that does less work, or no work at all, in explaining the inductive utility of the concept. For 
example, if low socioeconomic deprivation explains why “that sort of neighbourhood” is 
inductively fruitful, but low gun ownership does not, low socioeconomic deprivation is a 
 
global workspace of some kind (F1) is coextensive in humans with possessing a global workspace with the 
specific cognitive architecture of the human global workspace (F2). Papineau (1993, p. 124) discussed a similar 
issue very briefly in earlier work. Shevlin (2020b) discusses a related idea under the heading of “the specificity 
problem”. See also footnote 9. 
6 Papineau (1993, p. 126, footnote 23) makes a similar point, briefly. 
7 Shea (2012, p. 335): “irrespective of whether we conceive of [phenomenal consciousness] as being the 
occupant of a functional role, our concept refers to whatever property underpins the successful inductions in 
which it is deployed.” Shea credits this idea to Millikan (2000). 
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more eligible referent—it attracts the reference of the concept more strongly. 
 
Can we use inductive considerations to discriminate between F and N? It is plausible that we 
sometimes use PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS in successful inductions. For example, 
there are inductive links between conscious experience and memory: if I am having a 
phenomenally conscious experience of perceiving a stimulus S now, I am likely to retain an 
episodic memory of perceiving S later; but if I perceive S unconsciously, it is very unlikely 
that I will form an episodic memory of perceiving S. There are also inductive links between 
conscious experience and imagination. If I have had phenomenally conscious experiences in 
a perceptual modality M (e.g. colour vision), I am likely to be able to imagine having 
experiences in M; whereas if I have had never such experiences, I will struggle to imagine 
what they would be like. Perhaps F will play a much greater role than N, or vice versa, in 
explaining why these inductions work. 
 
Yet I am doubtful that the relation of realization allows enough space between F and N for 
one to be substantially more relevant than the other to the explanation of our inductive 
successes. If we can explain the inductive links between conscious experience, memory and 
imagination in our own case by appealing to F and its integration with the cognitive 
architecture of memory and imagination, then we can also explain them by appealing to N 
and its integration with the human neural implementation of memory and imagination. The 
explanation can proceed equally well at either level, cognitive or neural, and the two 
explanations will complement each other. Whatever successful induction we choose, there 
will be a cognitive-level explanation for its success that appeals to F and its connections to 
other cognitive properties, and a neural-level explanation that appeals to N and its 
connections to the human neural implementations of other cognitive properties. 
 
To find successful inductions for which F and N differ in their explanatory relevance, we 
would have to admit (as relevant for reference-fixing purposes) successful inductions 
concerning systems without N, such as inductions about how conscious experience relates to 
memory and imagination in insects or robots. But we cannot take it for granted in this context 
that any such inductions are actually successful—to regard them as successful would beg the 
question by assuming that PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS refers to F rather than to N.8 
In sum, appealing to inductive utility seems to help with “that sort of neighbourhood”, where 
the candidates for reference are distinct in a way that gives them very different types of 
explanatory significance, but it seems not to help with cases where the two properties vying 
for reference are related by realization.9 
 
8 This is related to a point made by Michel (2019). Michel argues: to test the claim that pain is multiply 
realizable, we need to settle the question of whether it is present in any animals with different neural states that 
play the same functional role as pain. But to settle this question, we first need to know whether pain is multiply 
realizable. The threat here is one of epistemic circularity. But there is also a threat of semantic circularity for a 
semantic theory such as Shea’s that ties reference to inductive success. 
9 Shea’s response is more useful, I suggest, for defusing Carruthers’ concern about indeterminacy between F1 
and F2 (see footnote 5). We might well find that one of these cognitive properties is more relevant than the other 
to the cognitive-level explanation of our inductive successes. There will plausibly be a cognitive property that 
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Given the above, it is plausible that, if type-B materialism is true, then the reference of 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS is indeterminate between F and N. It is worth 
considering briefly why the same problem does not resurface for different solutions to the 
mind-body problem. It does not arise for forms of dualism (interactionist or 
epiphenomenalist) or Russellian monism (including forms of panpsychism and 
panprotopsychism) because these views accept our intuitive conceptions about 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS, including conceptions that concern its non-functional, 
intrinsic, distinctively first-personal nature. These views posit a special type of property that 
answers to those conceptions. The hard questions for these views are why we should believe 
that such properties exist, and how to reconcile their existence with a scientific worldview—
not whether (if they do exist) the concept PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS succeeds in 
picking them out. 
 
What about an analytic functionalist, such as Lewis (1983)? The analytic functionalist might 
deny that PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS refers to anything, favouring instead more 
specific concepts such as PAIN, for which the corresponding a priori functional role is more 
easily specified (they would then be a kind of strong illusionist). Alternatively, they might try 
to construct an a priori functional specification of PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Let 
us set aside for the moment the problem posed to this idea by the conceivability of zombies. 
If they were to take this route, they could further argue that PHENOMENAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS is ambiguous between two functionally defined concepts, one of which 
determinately refers to a role-property (what Lewis might have called the “attribute of having 
phenomenal consciousness”), and the other of which determinately refers to N, the neural 
state that realizes the phenomenal consciousness role in humans (cf. Lewis 1983, note 6). The 
corresponding problem for ethics would be one of choosing how to resolve this ambiguity in 
ethical contexts. That would be an interesting problem in its own right, but it is distinct from 
the problem that confronts the type-B materialist, and I will not discuss it further here. 
 
3. Managing radical moral indeterminacy 
By combining the considerations from the last two sections, and assuming type-B 
materialism is true, we can run the following argument: 
 
(Premise 1) For non-rational animals that possess valenced states (including many non-
mammalian animals), the question of whether or not the animal has phenomenality-
linked moral status (PLMS) hinges on whether at least some of the valenced states are 
consciously experienced. 
(Premise 2) The reference of PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS is indeterminate 
between a neuronal realizer property (N) that is not shared by non-mammalian animals 
and a high-level functional property (F) that is shared by many non-mammalian 
animals.  
 
includes just enough architectural specificity to explain what needs explaining (e.g. the links between 
consciousness, memory and imagination) but no more specificity than is necessary. 
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(Disturbing conclusion): For many non-mammalian animals, it is indeterminate 
whether or not the animal has PLMS. 
 
Can we accept the disturbing conclusion, or would doing so lead to a catastrophic meltdown 
of our rational deliberations regarding the treatment of non-human animals?  
 
It is helpful here to distinguish between objective obligations and what have been called 
“subjective oughts” or “decision oughts” (Williams 2017). If an animal’s moral status is 
indeterminate, our objective moral obligations will be indeterminate in relation to that 
animal. But it seems we can still ask: in practical deliberation, ought I give its interest the 
special weight owed to the interests of a conscious being, or not? I must choose between 
these options; the structure of deliberation forces a choice upon me. So ought I treat the 
animal as if it had PLMS or as if it did not have PLMS? The ought in question is a decision 
ought.  
 
If there is no fact of the matter in relation to decision oughts, then we do indeed face a 
meltdown of practical deliberation. But objective indeterminacy may not have to spill over 
into indeterminacy at the level of decision oughts. There are various principles we could 
endorse that would prevent indeterminacy from derailing practical deliberation, allowing us 
to move from objectively indeterminate moral status to determinate decision oughts. I will 
call these principles “blocking principles”. 
 
One possible blocking principle draws inspiration directly from Williams (2017). Williams 
proposes that “a choice to X is decision permissible iff it is not determinately objectively 
impermissible to X” (2017, p. 670). If neither of two options is determinately objectively 
impermissible, then we may (subjectively, in our practical deliberations) treat both options as 
if they were permissible. In moving from indeterminacy to decision, we err on the side of 
permissiveness. A natural way to apply this idea to the present problem is the following: 
 
Blocking principle 1: If an animal has objectively indeterminate PLMS, then all 
choices with respect to that animal that are not objectively determinately 
impermissible are decision-permissible, as long as they are diachronically 
consistent with the same agent’s other choices. 
 
The motivation for Blocking principle 1 is the same as the motivation for Williams’ principle. 
Faced with indeterminate obligations, rational decision must avoid neutral sanction: sanction 
from the point of view of someone who takes no stand on indeterminate matters. Following 
Blocking principle 1 allows an agent to avoid neutral sanction. 
 
Williams includes a diachronic consistency constraint: you ought to avoid not just neutral 
sanction for doing something objectively impermissible, but also neutral sanction for being 
objectively inconsistent. Accordingly, once you have made a judgement call about an 
indeterminate fact, you ought to decide consistently with that judgement call in the future, as 
long as your views about the other issues at stake do not change. So, if you initially choose to 
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associate F with PLMS (e.g. when faced with the case of a bird), then all your subsequent 
decisions should be consistent with that (e.g. when faced with the case of a cognitively 
sophisticated invertebrate or robot). 
 
Williams notes that such a principle is likely to generate “queasiness” (2017, p. 671), since 
you may find yourself rationally compelled (by your initial arbitrary judgement call) to make 
long sequences of decisions that an alter-ego who made a different judgement call would find 
subjectively impermissible. In the present case, “queasiness” seems too weak a word: the 
principle leads to profound unease. Blocking principle 1 might have been acceptable if the 
only indeterminacy we faced were the mild, sorites-style form, so that our initial arbitrary 
judgement call would only very occasionally constrain our future choices. But when the 
indeterminacy infects our dealings with a very wide range of non-mammalian beings 
(including birds, reptiles, fish, invertebrates, future robots and AI), a huge amount seems to 
hang on the initial judgement call. If we choose to take N as the ground of PLMS, we will 
give the interests of mammals greater moral weight in any choice scenario where the interests 
of mammals and non-mammals clash. If we choose F, we will not give greater moral weight 
to the interests of mammals—and indeed will regard this as a form of baseless taxonomic 
chauvinism. 
 
The unease can be compounded by the following thought experiment: imagine an avian 
species one day evolves a human-level capacity for introspective and ethical thought. The 
avian creature constructs its own phenomenal concepts, which (assuming type-B materialism) 
refer to physical properties of its own brain. Suppose it constructs a concept of phenomenal 
consciousness* that refers to the sort of thing its phenomenal concepts pick out. This concept 
comes to carry great ethical significance for the avian creature. Unfortunately, its reference is 
indeterminate between F and N*, the neuronal realizer of F in the avian brain. It endorses 
Blocking principle 1, permissibly chooses to take N* as the ground of PLMS, and regards 
mammals, including humans, as lacking PLMS. The prospect of our avian counterpart 
reasoning in this way about us creates unease, and the source of the unease is Blocking 
principle 1.  
 
A different approach begins with the way we would approach cases of uncertain moral status, 
assuming a sharp boundary between sentient and non-sentient life—and then aims to treat 
indeterminacy on the model of epistemic uncertainty. When consciousness is uncertain but 
determinately present or absent, there is a strong case for applying a precautionary principle 
and erring on the side of attributing PLMS in any case where we find both credible evidence 
of valenced states and widespread practices that cause extreme negative valence (Birch 
2017). The same general thought, carried over to the case of indeterminacy, leads to the 
suggestion that, if an animal has objectively indeterminate PLMS, then it is decision-
obligatory to treat it in all respects as if it had PLMS. 
 
But this leads to the objection: is it plausible that, when you face a decision problem in which 
the interests of a determinately conscious animal come into conflict with the interests of an 
indeterminately conscious animal, determinacy has no moral significance at all? Suppose, for 
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example, you are a government or philanthropic foundation trying to decide whether to 
prioritise improving the welfare of mammals or birds. In the case of epistemic uncertainty, 
we can in principle handle trade-offs using probabilities, even though it is very challenging to 
estimate the probabilities. By contrast, in a case where we know that consciousness is 
indeterminate, it is very unclear what we should do, even in principle. It is certainly far from 
clear that we should attach no weight to determinacy. 
 
Three main variants of “treating indeterminate cases as if they had PLMS” arise, representing 
different ways of handling trade-offs. First: 
 
Blocking principle 2: If an animal has objectively indeterminate PLMS, then it is 
decision-obligatory to treat it in all respects as if it had PLMS, drawing no distinction 
(per se) between those animals that determinately possess PLMS and those animals 
whose PLMS is indeterminate. 
 
This version faces the criticism that it ignores the ethical relevance of indeterminacy. Faced 
with a choice between doing something determinately objectively obligatory and something 
indeterminately obligatory, it is plausible that our determinate obligations take priority (cf. 
Williams 2017, p. 655). For example, we plausibly have an obligation to intervene when a 
being with PLMS is tortured for no reason in front of us. Assume this, and suppose we are 
forced to choose between saving a determinately conscious being from torture and saving an 
indeterminately conscious being. On Blocking principle 2, we ought not take the determinacy 
into consideration as a morally relevant factor, and this seems wrong. 
 
The intuitive pull of granting some ethical relevance to determinacy can be captured by either 
of the following: 
 
Blocking principle 3: If an animal has objectively indeterminate PLMS, then it is 
decision-obligatory to treat it in all respects as if it had PLMS, subject to the 
qualification that lexical priority should be given to the interests of animals that 
determinately possess PLMS. 
 
Blocking principle 4: If an animal has objectively indeterminate PLMS, then it is 
decision-obligatory to treat it as if it had PLMS, while giving greater weight (a 
“determinacy multiplier”) but not lexical priority to the interests of animals that 
determinately possess PLMS. 
 
However, both principles bring us back to the problem of genealogical unease raised by our 
example of the introspective avian creature. They involve giving either lexical priority or 
greater weight to beings that share our own neuronal mechanisms, simply because they 
happen to share our own neuronal mechanisms. The introspective avian would be entitled to 
do likewise, deprioritizing or giving reduced weight to the interests of mammals. That 
prospect should give us pause before devaluing non-mammals in our own ethical 
deliberations. Of course, Blocking principle 4 faces an additional problem: that of finding a 
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non-arbitrary determinacy multiplier. 
 
These four blocking principles suggest that we are stuck between a whirlpool and a rock: the 
whirlpool is entirely denying the ethical significance of determinacy, and the rock is a kind of 
taxonomic chauvinism that should leave us profoundly uneasy, since it would allow a moral 
agent with a different neuronal realization of F to reason its way to chauvinism about us. To 
the extent that type-B materialism appears to leave us with a choice between abandoning a 
strongly plausible link between phenomenal consciousness and moral status, succumbing to a 
meltdown of practical deliberation regarding animals, or endorsing a blocking principle with 
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